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I 
n “Spinoza and Philo, The Alleged Mysticism in the Ethics,” 
Steven Nadler argues against any mystical interpretations of 
Spinoza, going so far as to say categorically that “there is no 
mysticism in Spinoza’s philosophy”.1 Nadler criticizes what 
he sees as the erroneous view that “Spinoza is seen not as the in-
heritor of the Cartesian devotion to clear and distinct reasoning, 
nor of the Jewish intellectualist tradition of Maimonides and Ger-
sonides, but as the descendent of the mysticism of Philo of Alex-
andria and of the later kabbalists”.2 Nadler goes on to argue that 
Spinoza’s “arch-rationalist” philosophy and epistemological com-
mitments are incompatible with such mystical notions as the inef-
fability of god, and the limitedness of the human intellect.3 How-
ever, I think Nadler’s claim may be too strong, certainly his cate-
gorical one, for it seems possible that one could compare Spinoza 
to kabbalists and mystics because of his metaphysical views, not 
his epistemological ones. And while I agree with Nadler that there 
are serious doubts regarding any kind of mysticism in Spinoza’s 
epistemology, Spinoza’s metaphysical views might allow for a 
mystical interpretation.  
 
In this paper I shall offer the beginnings of a mystical in-
terpretation of Spinoza’s metaphysics and ethical theory. I hope 
to show that there is a gap in Nadler’s argument that I aim to ex-
ploit: that because Spinoza’s metaphysics may allow for mystical 
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interpretation, and because his ethical theory is derived from his 
metaphysics, a mystical interpretation of Spinoza’s ethical theory 
could be promising. It is not my aim to offer a full account of Spi-
noza’s ethical theory, nor even a fully satisfying interpretation. 
Rather, I hope to show primarily that something like a mystical 
thought could be at work in Spinoza. I will begin with a brief re-
sponse to Nadler before turning to a discussion of Spinoza’s met-
aphysical and ethical views. Finally, I will compare Spinoza’s 
ethical theory to the teachings of the Jewish Wisdom tradition 
presented by contemporary writer Rev. Dr. Cynthia Bourgeault. 
In doing so, I hope to both offer further support for seeing some-
thing like mysticism at work in Spinoza, and to gesture at what 
kind of more traditional moral theory Spinoza could offer.  
Nadler rightly understands that ‘mysticism’ can mean 
many different things in many different contexts. As such, he 
adopts a narrow definition of mysticism as the target of his paper. 
For instance, he is not concerned with the “first-hand spiritual 
relationship” the mystic might have with god.4 Rather he holds 
that “the mysticist is someone who argues that the human intellect 
or reason cannot, by itself and through its own natural devices, 
provide one with a knowledge of God – neither of God’s exist-
ence nor of God’s essence – or of the higher metaphysical truths 
that derive from God”.5 I think he is quite right to argue that there 
is no mysticism of this kind at work in Spinoza. For, it seems 
clear that Spinoza’s commitment to the principle of sufficient rea-
son alone is enough to cast serious doubts on such a claim, not to 
mention Spinoza’s explicit claim that we can, and indeed must, be 
able to understand god with our minds alone. Nadler quotes Rich-
ard Mason on this issue: 
“Any philosopher who tells us that all individuals in dif-
ferent degrees are animate, that ‘we feel and experience 
that we are eternal’ or that an intuitive intellectual love of 
God arises from an eternal form of knowledge has to be 
open to mystical readings, justifiably or not. But any mys-
ticism [in Spinoza] is held in a firm grip. It is not mystical 
vision but logical proofs that are said to be the eyes of the 
mind. The love of God is to hold chief place in the mind; 
but it is clear and distinct understanding, not mystical illu-
Seeing with the Eyes of the Heart 8 
 
mination, which is to be the route to that love”6 
Notice that the mysticism that is “held in a firm grip” here 
is distinctly epistemological – logical proofs rather than mystical 
vision; clear and distinct understanding rather than mystical illu-
mination. But what about Spinoza’s metaphysical and ethical 
views? Indeed, what about this “love of God”? Nadler seems un-
concerned with this point. While it may be naïve to compare Spi-
noza to kabbalah (at least on Nadler’s account), I’m certainly not 
the only one who suspected that there may have been a connec-
tion.7 In her book, A History of God, Karen Armstrong concludes 
her discussion of Spinoza with the following: 
“Indeed, Spinoza had only used the word ‘God’ for histor-
ical reasons: he agreed with atheists, who claim that reali-
ty cannot be divided into a part which is ‘God’ and a part 
which is not-God. If God cannot be separated from any-
thing else, it is impossible to say that ‘he’ exists in any 
ordinary sense. What Spinoza was saying in effect was 
that there was no God that corresponded to the meaning 
we usually attach to that word. But mystics and philoso-
phers had been making the same point for centuries. Some 
had said that there was ‘Nothing’ apart from the world we 
know. Were it not for the absence of the transcendent En 
Sof, Spinoza’s pantheism would resemble Kabbalah and 
we could sense an affinity between radical mysticism and 
the newly emergent atheism.”8  
Notice that the above quote seems to support my claim 
that something like mysticism could be seen in Spinoza’s meta-
physics. For, as Armstrong asserts, were it not for the lack of the 
metaphor of ‘En Sof’ in Spinoza, his metaphysics would resemble 
those seen in kabbalah. And recall that while Nadler has in mind 
many of the epistemological views common in mystical traditions 
(and for Nadler, especially those in the thought of Philo), in the 
case of the above quote the comparison drawn between Spinoza 
and kabbalah is about metaphysical claims, not epistemological 
ones. Perhaps then Nadler’s working definition of mysticism is 
too limited for him to offer a persuasive case for the claim that 
“there is no mysticism in Spinoza’s philosophy”. And recall that 
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while Nadler is not concerned with the “first-hand spiritual rela-
tionship” that the mystic may have with the divine, I hope to 
show later on that Spinoza may have precisely such a relationship 
in mind in his account of human participation in the divine. Per-
haps Nadler’s argument could be made stronger if he were to ac-
count for this point.  
Admittedly, much depends on what exactly ‘mysticism’ 
means here. So how do I understand mysticism? And more to the 
point, how does this relate to Spinoza’s ethical theory? To offer a 
full account of mysticism, or a particular mystical tradition would 
unfortunately be beyond the limited scope of this paper. For my 
purposes, it is enough to say that since there is no ‘mysticism’ as 
such; there are only mystical traditions, I will understand mysti-
cism both in the metaphysical sense as seen in kabbalah and in 
the ethical sense of self-transformation in the ancient Jewish Wis-
dom tradition as presented by Bourgeault. To be specific, issues 
such as spiritual self-transformation, and human participation in 
the divine will be of key importance for my interpretation. I hope 
that both of these senses, and the connection between them be-
come clearer as I continue. I will now begin my discussion of 
Spinoza’s metaphysics. 
To quote Nadler once again, “an unreasonably brief sum-
mary of Spinoza’s metaphysics is required here”.9 For reasons of 
brevity, I too must offer a brief and simplified account of Spino-
za’s metaphysics. In short, Spinoza is a substance monist, and he 
holds that the universe is one infinite, necessarily-existing sub-
stance (‘substance’ here is understood in more or less the same 
sense that Descartes understood it). Spinoza calls this substance 
“God or nature”.10 Of course, this god is not the anthropomorphic 
god offered by most interpreters of Christianity, for instance. Ra-
ther, it is simply all that is. However, this is not to diminish god’s 
significance, as we will see. To continue, this god has an infinite 
number of what Spinoza calls “attributes,”11 two of which are 
“thought”12 and “extension”.13 In addition, Spinoza holds that all 
things that exist are manifestations or “modes” of this god.14 As 
such, the bodies of human beings are a mode of extension, while 
our minds are a mode of thought. It may be difficult to wrap one’s 
head around just what this god might look like, and it might seem 
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silly to most of us today. If I may joke for a moment in the hopes 
of demonstrating this view – perhaps the reader could imagine 
filling out that form at the psychiatrist’s office that attempts to 
determine if the prospective patient suffers from a mental illness 
(for surely we all know that form). And at the box that asks, “Do 
you ever feel like you are god?” the correct answer for the Spino-
zist would seem to be “yes” (albeit with a lengthy list of qualifi-
cations, the most important of which is that everybody else is god 
too). 
 Before considering Spinoza’s ethical theory proper, I 
would like to emphasize several aspects of his philosophy that 
serve to frame his ethical views. It is important to first say that for 
Spinoza, ethics is not so much about how we ought to act in a 
given situation, but rather with “the right way of living”.15 Spino-
za sought to improve people’s lives and their characters by fur-
thering their knowledge, and in particular, their self-knowledge. 
He hoped therein to bring people peace of mind as they may 
come to see themselves as aspects of nature existing in harmony 
with nature. In addition, he thought that human beings are bound 
or constrained by our inability to control and check the emotions, 
and that it was our task to find a way to overcome this “bondage” 
and to realize an autonomous life of freedom.16 Of course, 
‘freedom’ for Spinoza must be qualified, for in light of his neces-
sitarianism Spinoza held that there was no ‘free will’ as such. 
However, he argued that freedom still exists, and he defined it as 
the capacity for a thing to act on the basis of its own nature, more 
or less unconstrained by external causes. On his account to act on 
the basis of this freedom is to be ‘active,’ rather than ‘passive,’ 
and it is most desirable to be active. Freedom as activity here re-
lates to one of the most important aspects of his philosophy: that 
of the doctrine of “conatus” or “striving.”17 Spinoza writes "each 
thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its 
existence," and he goes on to write "the striving [conatus] by 
which each thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but 
the actual essence of the thing".18 In short, this striving becomes 
an a priori activity of each entity, and this striving is the very es-
sence of that entity.  
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Turning now to Spinoza’s ethical theory proper, he argued 
that the path to an autonomous life, free from the bondage of the 
emotions lay in two related concepts he called the “intellectual 
love of god,” and “blessedness”.19 Briefly, this blessedness is a 
state of joy that arises out of the act of the intellectual love of god. 
And the intellectual love of god involves furthering one’s 
knowledge of oneself and of god. What makes this love joyful is 
simply that it is pleasurable. However, once again this is not to 
diminish its significance! For Spinoza held that the love of god is 
the most constant and pleasurable of all emotions. Spinoza makes 
clear his search for precisely this joy at the outset of the Treatise 
on the Emendation of the Intellect: 
“After experience had taught me that all the things which 
regularly occur in ordinary life are empty and futile, and I 
saw that all the things which were the cause or object of 
my fear had nothing of good or bad in themselves, except 
insofar as my mind was moved by them, I resolved at last 
to try to find out whether there was anything which would 
be the true good, capable of communicating itself, and 
which alone would affect the mind, all others being reject-
ed - whether there was something which, once found and 
acquired, would continuously give me the greatest joy, to 
eternity.”20  
Put simply, the “true good” here that was to offer the 
“greatest joy, to eternity” is the knowledge of god. This point can 
be seen in the following passage: “the mind’s highest good is the 
knowledge of God, and the minds highest virtue is to know 
God”.21 This is because god is the highest ‘object’ of knowledge, 
and it is the goal of the mind to further its own knowledge. Thus 
the eternal joy of blessedness arises in the perfecting of one’s 
knowledge of god, for this perfecting of knowledge allows the 
mind to fulfill its nature and become more active, and to thereby 
further its freedom. Moreover, Spinoza holds that in the intellec-
tual love of god one’s own knowledge begins to resemble god’s 
knowledge. This is because the intellectual love of god is the 
product of what Spinoza calls the “third kind of knowledge” or 
“intuition,” a full account of which is beyond the scope of this 
paper.22 For my purposes, it is enough to say that ‘intuition’ is 
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something like scientific reasoning and discovery (not the kind of 
‘intuition’ we might speak of in ordinary language). This ‘third 
kind of knowledge’ allows us to understand the nature or essence 
of an entity, and in doing so, we come to know each entity more 
like god does. Furthermore, and this is a key point, in pursuing 
the intellectual love of god, one also becomes more god-like, and 
furthers her own divine nature as she participates further in the 
infinite intellect of god. In “Spinoza’s Ethical Theory,” Don Gar-
rett discusses this human participation in the divine: 
“Human beings stand, for Spinoza, in an intimate relation-
ship both to God-or-Nature…This implies, on the one 
hand, that human beings cannot act independently of, or 
separately from, God's own activity, and that every human 
action must be conceived as a manifestation of nature; but 
it also implies, on the other hand, that there is a prospect 
for a kind of direct participation in the divine”23 
Indeed, this “intimate relationship” with god and “direct 
participation in the divine” seem to suggest the kind of “first-hand 
relationship” with god that Nadler is decidedly not considering. 
And it is precisely this point of divine participation that first 
sparked my interest in the possible mysticism at work in Spinoza. 
But on Spinoza’s account, not only do we participate in 
the divine, we also love the divine and are in turn loved by it. This 
is because in the intellectual love of god, we come to love god as 
an object. But because we too share in god, we also love our-
selves as aspects of god through god’s own loving of itself. In 
other words, we love god through the love with which god loves 
itself and with which god loves us. Richard Mason is right to 
point out that this love of god is achieved through reasoning and 
understanding, not through mystical illumination, yet our partici-
pation in the divine, and in this divine love seem strikingly mysti-
cal nonetheless. 
Turning now to how Spinoza’s ethical theory is derived 
from his metaphysics, notice that in the Ethics, the metaphysics 
offered in the first three books support, and perhaps even necessi-
tate the ethical conclusions offered in books four and five. And as 
I continue to argue, the seemingly mystical nature of these meta-
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physical claims could show support for a mystical interpretation 
of Spinoza’s ethical claims. On this point Garrett writes:  
“The centrality of ethics to [Spinoza’s] philosophical pro-
ject is unmistakable in the title of his most systematic 
presentation of his philosophy: Ethics Demonstrated in 
Geometrical Order…The Ethics seeks to demonstrate a 
broad range of metaphysical, theological, epistemological, 
and psychological doctrines. Most of these doctrines, 
however, either constitute, support, or elucidate the prem-
ises for his ethical conclusions”24  
I pointed out earlier that Spinoza’s ethical concern was 
primarily with the right way of living, and not with what actions 
are morally permissible or impermissible. This is not to say that 
he was entirely unconcerned with questions of moral action, yet 
Spinoza seems at first glance to present something of an ethical 
egoism. For his concern is only with each individual’s own striv-
ing, and there seems to be no obvious concern for the wellbeing 
of others. This can be seen in the following passage from the Eth-
ics:  
“Since reason demands nothing contrary to nature, it 
therefore demands that every man should love himself, 
should seek his own advantage (I mean his real ad-
vantage), should aim at whatever really leads a man to-
ward greater perfection, and, to sum it all up, that each 
man, as far as in him lies, should endeavor to preserve his 
own being”25 
But notice that there might be an implicit concern here for 
how we ought to treat others. For if each thing strives to preserve 
itself (or further itself), and if each thing shares in the same di-
vine nature, then in a sense furthering one’s own nature is further-
ing another’s, and furthering another’s nature is furthering one’s 
own. Moreover, recall that it is in each entity’s nature to strive in 
this way; it is its very essence to strive! While Spinoza’s exact 
view here may be tricky to parse, he may still have the resources 
to offer at least something in the vein of a traditional moral theo-
ry. Although, as I mentioned earlier Spinoza offers unfortunately 
little by way of an account of this view in the Ethics. And so it is 
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at precisely this point that a comparison to the view presented by 
Bourgeault may prove useful.  
In The Wisdom Jesus, Cynthia Bourgeault offers an inter-
pretation of Jesus as a teacher in the Jewish Wisdom tradition, 
that is, a teacher of self-transformation.26 She argues that the as-
cetic path of the Far East isn’t the only path to ‘enlightenment,’ 
and that Jesus took an altogether different path, that of ‘Kenosis,’ 
or the radical giving of oneself to others. Bourgeault holds that 
while the ascetics would attempt to ‘store-up’ their spiritual ener-
gy, so to speak, and to climb higher ‘up’ the ladder to enlighten-
ment, Jesus went the opposite direction: he climbed ‘down’ the 
ladder, giving away all of himself at every step. And as 
Bourgeault points out, it only cost him everything – including his 
life. 
At the heart of Bourgeault’s interpretation is the view that 
Jesus preached a method of self-transformation that involves the 
awakening of a non-dual consciousness. Bourgeault argues that 
human beings are stuck in a ‘binary’ worldview of good/bad, 
black/white, commonly called the ego, though Bourgeault herself 
prefers the now dated computer-age metaphor of “the egoic oper-
ating system”.27 She puts this thought nicely when she describes 
the ego as a “grammar of perception” that creates labels, and sep-
arates the world into categories.28 Readers may notice that the 
‘death of the ego’ is championed in many Eastern and New Age 
schools of thought, though I would add that it is often poorly un-
derstood. To her credit, Bourgeault doesn’t simply dismiss the 
ego, she recognizes its usefulness. She holds that the egoic form 
of perception is often necessary for our navigation of the ordinary 
world. But, she insists, the ego creates a grand illusion of sepa-
rateness that prevents us from realizing our divine natures. 
Bourgeault argues that Jesus teaches us to transcend, or 
‘upgrade’ (to continue the unfortunate metaphor) the egoic oper-
ating system and move toward a non-dual consciousness. 
So what exactly is ‘non-duality’? In short, non-duality 
teaches us that there is simply no separation. There is no separa-
tion between humans and god, and no separation between humans 
and humans. This non-duality is the notion of ‘oneness’ that is 
often preached in Eastern and New Age schools of thought, and 
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For instance, I still recognize myself as distinct in some 
sense from the tree outside, or from ‘the other,’ so to speak. This 
is why the ‘egoic form of perception’ is still useful. Indeed, we 
require the egoic form of perception in order to be efficacious in 
the world. What non-duality really seeks to emphasize is the 
shared essence common to all beings.  
Bourgeault describes this form of non-dual consciousness 
as “seeing with the eyes of the heart”.29 In the Wisdom tradition, 
‘the heart’ does not refer to the Western notion of the heart as 
simply one’s feelings or emotions, rather it is a metaphor for a 
kind of spiritual perception that includes wisdom, a sense of uni-
ty, subconscious perceptions, creativity, the analytic mind, intui-
tion, emotions, etc. These faculties are lumped under one name, 
‘the heart,’ as a way of pointing out that they are meant to work in 
harmony. This may seem cheesy to those not steeped in mysti-
cism, but I ask the reader to enter into the spirit of the view for a 
moment.  
Seeing with the eyes of the heart, then, means seeing with-
out separation. It means adopting the perspective of god and one-
ness, and seeing others as oneself and oneself as others (recall 
that Spinoza may have a similar thought about our shared divine 
natures). Indeed, loving thy neighbour simply as oneself. 
Bourgeault clarifies that “… this does not mean that you see God 
as an object (for that would be the egoic operating system), but 
rather, you see through the eyes of non-duality; God is the seeing 
itself”.30 Notice that Bourgeault’s use of ‘god’ here and through-
out the text, doesn’t seem to suggest the anthropomorphic god of 
ordinary Christianity. Instead, it seems that she has in mind a god 
similar to the god of Spinoza and the god of the mystics; a god 
that is everything.  
It seems then, that as we further ‘see with the eyes of the 
heart’, we may further realize our divine natures through recogni-
tion of other beings as part of the divine. Likewise, seeing with 
the eyes of the heart could perhaps bring about something like the 
joy of Spinoza’s notion of blessedness. For as Bourgeault stress-
es, non-dual consciousness is one path to peacefulness of mind 
and heart, and this peacefulness may bring about emancipation 
from the bondage of emotions. 
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My comparison between Spinoza and Bourgeault’s re-
spective views may prove useful for a variety of reasons.31 First, 
the view she presents seems compatible with Spinoza’s own view 
in several manners – the teaching of self-transformation, the 
recognition of shared divine natures, the similarities between their 
respective understandings of ‘god’, the desire for peace of mind. 
Second, it may shed some light on how Spinoza could avoid 
charges of ethical egoism, through the seeing of oneself as anoth-
er and another as oneself.32 Third, it hints at something like a 
moral theory based upon the mutual recognition of shared divine 
natures. Of course, on this point, Bourgeault’s aim is not to pre-
sent a moral philosophy, nor is she writing as a philosopher, but 
her discussion of non-dual consciousness is helpful in this regard 
nonetheless. For perhaps an ethics of non-duality could offer 
something like a maxim of compassion and empathy that seeks to 
emphasize what transcends difference – that is, our shared divine 
natures. And finally, it might help to situate Spinoza’s philosophy 
within the framework of another mystical tradition, that of the 
Jewish Wisdom tradition. 
In this paper, I hope to have shown that something like 
mystical thought could be at work in Spinoza’s metaphysics and 
ethical theory. Contrary to Nadler, I have argued that Spinoza’s 
“arch rationalist” philosophy might not be a barrier to all mystical 
interpretations of his work, particularly in light of Spinoza’s as-
sertion that human beings can participate in the divine through the 
intellectual love of god. I have argued that because Spinoza’s eth-
ical theory is derived from his metaphysics, a mystical interpreta-
tion of his metaphysics could support further mystical interpreta-
tion of his ethical theory. I have shown several ways in which 
Bourgeault’s views could help clarify Spinoza’s. However, I have 
only presented here the first steps toward a fully satisfying inter-
pretation of the possible mystical elements in Spinoza. It is the 
topic of a much larger paper to draw out the implications of any 
such mysticism in Spinoza, and it is a matter for historians to de-
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